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In recent years, there is rising attention on the diﬃ  cult ﬁ nancing problems of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). With constant development and improvement in China’s socialist market 
economy system, SMEs is becoming a pivotal part of China’s national economy. It can be said that 
the development of SMEs makes a great contribution to China’s national economy development. 
However, SMEs are facing ﬁ nancing bottlenecks at the same time. This is not only because of the 
limited ﬁ nancing capabilities of SMEs themselves but also because of the various commercial bank 
credit policies. It is necessary to solve credit policy problems between SMEs and banks, not only for 
SMEs but also for the further development of commercial banks. This paper analyses the problems 
and the reasons of “credit grudging” behavior of China’s commercial banks and SMEs ﬁ nancing 
diﬃ  culties through a critical analysis. This paper also uses the method of the dynamic game theory to 
probe into credit problems between SMEs and commercial banks under the condition of information 
asymmetry. At the end of the paper, conclusions are made and suggestions are proposed for a win-win 
solution concerning credit policy problems between SMEs and commercial banks.
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Financing diﬃ  culty among SMEs does not 
only exist in China, but also prevails worldwide. 
SMEs has been the major force of the national 
economy in recent years (Li, 2011; Hu and Zhou, 
2011; Bai et al., 2012), however, due to the adverse 
conditions of SMEs such as small scale, few assets, 
low credit degree and discriminatory treatments 
from government and the market, the diﬃ  culty of 
ﬁ nancing is gradually becoming the bottleneck for 
Chinese SMEs under the situation of banks’ ‘credit 
grudging’ (Liu, 2007). This increasingly obvious 
problem is now the concern of the country, and 
several laws and regulations or speciﬁ c policies have 
been carried out by government to support SMEs 
(ACFIC, 2012).
Taking loans from ﬁ nancial institutions is the 
major ﬁ nancial channel for Chinese SMEs (Meyer, 
1998). As the major force of the SME credit market, 
Commercial bank is the key component of Chinese 
ﬁ nancial institutions (Xu, 2008). Nevertheless, 
commercial banks do not put much emphasis 
on SME ﬁ nancing service problems according to 
previous research (Beck, 2006). Under the situation 
of close integration of Chinese and global economy, 
new challenges and opportunities would put 
Chinese SMEs in a strong position. By drawing on 
the experiences of foreign banking to eliminate 
credit risk, SMEs would certainly become another 
proﬁ t growth point for domestic commercial banks 
(Wu and Wang, 2012). In order to ﬁ nd a feasible 
solution for solving ﬁ nancing problem for SMEs, 
this paper aims to study domestic credit policies and 
strategies towards SMEs, in the context of current 
trend of banks’ development and China’s economy. 
The study on credit policy is helpful for achieving 
a win-win situation between commercial banks 
and SMEs. SMEs can broaden their capital source 
to maintain a sustainable development while banks 
can promote innovation in the ﬁ eld of ﬁ nancing 
system (Zhu, 2004).
In the literature an increasing number of 
researches have been carried out for studying 
the problem of commercial banks’ sustainable 
development. Researchers conduct theoretical 
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research in the belief that the market of oﬀ ering 
ﬁ nancial services to SMEs could be potentially 
proﬁ table to commercial banks (Li, 2009; Xu, 
2008; Zhu, 2004; Wan, 2010; Wang et al., 2011). The 
theory of credit rationing refers to the circumstance 
in which the demand for commercial loan in the 
credit market is greater than the supply, given the 
ﬁ xed bank lending rate (Geng, 2011). There are 
diﬀ erent explanations for the emergence of credit 
rationing. Jaﬀ e and Modigliani (1969) argued that 
the restriction imposed on monopoly power leads 
to credit constraint, which could ﬁ nally cause credit 
rationing. Besides, according to the asymmetric 
information theory, moral hazard and adverse 
selection are considered as the major contributors 
to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
Game theory is the study of strategic decision 
making between the subjective and the objective. 
In the game theory, every gamer would consider 
the possible eﬀ ects of one action on other gamers, 
therefore every gamer would choose the best 
scheme to optimize their own interests (Ping, 2001). 
Game theory has been widely used in economics 
as an important analytical method. Asymmetry 
information is one cause of SMEs’ diﬃ  culty in 
applying for loans. In this paper, game theory is 
used to analyse banks’ credit process in order to 
shed some lights on credit policy problems. 
RESEARCH METHOD
This paper analyses the causes of credit grudging 
from the perspective of commercial banks. In this 
paper economic game theory (Myerson, 1991) is 
ﬁ rst applied in order to make a full analysis of the 
dynamic information between commercial banks 
and SMEs. This paper also uses case study method 
(Yin, 2002) to point out the major problems as well 
as the causes of ﬁ nancing problems of SMEs. In 
the case study, the analysis of whether commercial 
banks should grant SME credit ﬁ nancing is carried 
out on the Tyron commercial Bank. In the following 
ﬁ rst we analyse the current situation of SMEs; 
secondly, we discuss whether commercial banks 
should perform credit operations for SMEs; ﬁ nally, 
we work on how to solve SME credit problems.
Current Credit Status and Problems
The rapid emergence and development of SMEs 
has become one of the mainstays in China’s national 
economy since the reform and opening up in 1978. 
The development of SMEs has irreplaceable strategic 
importance to the national economy and the entire 
society. Financing channels for SMEs could be 
generally divided into two categories, endogenous 
and extraneous source ﬁ nancing (Shi, 2007). 
Endogenous source ﬁ nancing has a wide range, 
including equity fund, risk investment capitals, 
enterprise business ﬁ nancing capital, etc. There are 
two major kinds of extraneous source ﬁ nancing, 
indirect ﬁ nancing which means ﬁ nancing through 
commercial banks and direct ﬁ nancing which refers 
to ﬁ nancing without ﬁ nancial institutions. 
However, certain problems still exist in 
SME’s ﬁ nancing. The ﬁ nancing channel is quite 
simplex in our country because of the lack of 
intercommunication. Most SMEs consider applying 
for loans form commercial banks as the ﬁ rst option 
to deal with ﬁ nancial matter, and due to the short 
loan duration, SME hardly use the loan for scale-
expanding reproduction. Currently SMEs are being 
too dependent on loan support from commercial 
banks, which indicates the lack of ﬁ nancing 
channels.
In addition, as shown in Tab. I, domestic listed 
threshold is too high for SMEs. Because of the 
late construction of domestic capital market, our 
country is not well developed compared with those 
developed countries. Although the board for SMEs 
is set in Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the ﬁ nancial 
restriction still made SMEs hard to go public. The 
listed threshold is set according to the provisions 
of Corporation Law, including three-year-proﬁ t 
of 30 million RMB and cumulative net value of 
cash ﬂ ow over ﬁ  y million etc. Therefore nearly 
more than 70 percent of SMEs have no listing plan 
yet. Commercial bank plays an important role in 
the developing process of SMEs, the continuous 
optimization of credit structure stimulates our 
economic structure’s development and ﬁ nancial 
service quality.
I: The implementation of major ﬁ nancing in the last three years (divided according to the scale of enterprises, %)
Large-scale 
enterprises
Medium-sized 
enterprises
Small-sized 
enterprises
Long-term bank loan 82.4 78.4 67.7
Private lending 19.2 48.3 67.8
Syndicated loan 16.5 15.7 14
Introduction of private equity/ risk investment 12.2 11.8 9
Issue short-term financing bonds 12.9 2.4 1.7
Going public 16.1 2.7 0.7
Listed companies issue additional stock 11 1.3 0.5
Issue converted bonds 6.3 1.2 1.5
Data source: The growth of capital market and Chinese entrepreneurs: the present and the future, the problems and the 
suggestions – investigation report on the development of Chinese enterprise operators 2011.
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SME credit market development is limited due 
to the problems of commercial banks’ ﬁ nancial 
system (Garcia, 2005); SMEs could not meet the 
standard of credit rating policy, which is set for 
large-scale enterprises (Bai, 2012). Besides the 
biased assessment, commercial banks also make the 
examination and approval process taking too long, 
negative eﬀ ects could be exerted on SMEs with short 
and urgent needs for money. As a matter of fact, most 
banks are reluctant to lend because of the risk. It is 
necessary for banking industry to improve ﬁ nancial 
service targeting SMEs. As a result of unstable 
operating status and insuﬃ  cient guaranteed 
mortgage, domestic commercial banks discriminate 
against SMEs. By contrast, commercial banks in 
China have better relationship with large state-
owned enterprises since it takes less risk. Currently, 
commercial banks still have not set up robust 
small business accountability system and tolerance 
policies, which lead to bank personnel’s low 
initiative in marketing bank’s services. Discounting 
the importance of SMEs led to the lack of product 
innovation in credit service. It would be diﬃ  cult 
to meet the ﬁ nancing needs of SMEs without new 
credit products especially tailored for SMEs. Those 
existing products are rather traditional, attaching 
with many requirements such as providing security 
and mortgaged property. SMEs are facing a lot of 
barriers in ﬁ nancing in Chinese ﬁ nancial market.
The reasons behind the credit problems come 
from SMEs, commercial banks and the government. 
Chinese SMEs are generally in a weak position, 
given the small scale, weak competitiveness 
and small inﬂ uence. The unstable international 
economic situation adds to the risk to SMEs, the 
prospect of Chinese SMEs is therefore full of 
uncertainty. In addition, SMEs’ capital adequacy 
ratio is low with little capital; the small proportion 
of ﬁ xed assets causes a shortage of property for 
guaranteed property; ﬁ nancial system of most SMEs 
is not perfect. Another drawback of SMEs is the 
lack of managerial and administrative expertise and 
enterprise credit. Most SMEs’ credit ratings are too 
low to reach the credit requirements of domestic 
commercial banks. 
As a self-ﬁ nancing market participant, commercial 
banks will consider proﬁ tability, liquidity, risk 
and security in providing their services. Given 
the situation of government’s requirement of 
controlling capital adequacy ratio and bad loan 
ratio, commercial banks would deﬁ nitely choose 
large-scale enterprises with strong managerial 
and administrative expertise instead of SMEs with 
disappointing ﬁ nancial indexes. Therefore policy 
barriers were set in consideration of avoiding 
risks. Furthermore, since there is a lack of related 
motivation system, grassroots service personnel 
do not have the initiative to develop or serve 
SMEs. Many bankers attach so much attention 
to risk control that they ignore the proﬁ tability 
from providing services to SMEs. The information 
asymmetry makes small enterprises unable to carry 
out repeated game, which causes banks to issue 
a loan on a lower equilibrium level. The number of 
SMEs’ credit operation is therefore greatly reduced. 
Since the development of market economy in 
China started late with imperfect ﬁ nancial system, 
government does not have suﬃ  cient experience in 
instructing banks in the ﬁ eld of SMEs’ ﬁ nancing. 
All kinds of rules and regulations increase SMEs’ 
diﬃ  culty in applying for loans. Moreover, the 
distinct lack of small and medium-sized ﬁ nancial 
institutions in Chinese capital market makes loan 
obtaining even harder for SMEs.
In conclusion, SMEs’ diﬃ  culty in applying for 
loans and commercial banks’ credit reluctance 
to providing services to SMEs are caused by the 
shortages of small enterprises themselves, the 
government false instructions, and the unsound 
domestic ﬁ nancial market.
Credit Game Model Analysis
To apply game theory, the paper made the 
related hypotheses as follows: as the participants 
of credit game, commercial banks and SMEs are 
both risk averters. They are rational gamers who 
will not make irrational mistakes, and they are 
able to make rational decisions to optimize their 
own interests under certain circumstances; this 
paper sets the credit game as a dynamic game, in 
which SMEs ﬁ rstly take decisions concerning the 
information they mastered, commercial banks 
will then determine their own actions according to 
SMEs’ operation information; in the game process 
of this paper, the information that the two sides 
gain will be incomplete and asymmetry; the credit 
game is assumed to be an non-cooperative game 
with no collusions or conspiracy in any forms 
between commercial banks and SMEs; Only a part 
of applicants could receive a bank loan in this game, 
while other applicants could not obtain a loan with 
higher interest rates; no government’s administrative 
intervention exists in this game process. 
At the stage of applying for a loan, some SMEs 
with poor ﬁ nancial condition would provide banks 
with fraud ﬁ nancial statements or accounting 
statement to obtain loans. In this paper, as shown in 
Fig. 1, enterprises with high risk is assumed as High 
(H), low risk as Low (L); the probability of gaining 
a bank loan is P for the low risk type, and 1 − P for 
the high risk type; assuming loan principal is C, 
loan interest is I, the total of principal and interest 
is R = C + I. If the bank makes a correct decision to 
lend to SMEs with low risk, there will be proﬁ t 
space for the bank. Otherwise, the bank will take 
higher opportunity cost as well as the rising ratio of 
potential nonperforming loan and assets. 
During the game stage, L can provide the real 
ﬁ nancial management information to banks to 
reﬂ ect the risk level, and they can repay the loan 
principal and the interest on schedule. Let the 
probability of receiving a loan for L be P, and the 
proﬁ ts gained by the enterprises be B (L), then the 
net income a er paying the interest and principal 
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will be NE = B (L) − R, and the net income is larger 
than zero. If L cannot receive a bank loan, then 
there will be no extraneous income for SMEs 
or banks. H may withhold information about its 
ﬁ nancial position; let the hidden cost be F and the 
probability of obtaining a loan for H be 1 − P. A high-
risk enterprise usually intends to delay bankruptcy 
time or gain personal wealth by obtaining a loan. 
Assuming the income for H is B (H), which is larger 
than zero but smaller than C; banks would have 
diﬃ  culty in regaining the credit amount, which 
could lead to a rising non-performing loan ratio. In 
order to minimize the loss, coeﬃ  cient a (0 < a < 1) is 
introduced. The bank’s income would be a × C, and 
a × C = C − B (H), therefore B (H) = (1 − a) × C. On the 
contrary, if false information of H is seen through 
by banks, the loan requests would be rejected. The 
income of H would be – F and the bank would retain 
the principal.
A er getting hold of SMEs’ information, banks 
would decide on whether issue loans or not. In the 
ideal situation, banks could accurately discriminate 
the risk coeﬃ  cient. The banks would lend to L since 
the interest income is I (I > 0), and they would not 
lend to H since the proﬁ t is a × C < C; rather, banks 
would lend to H instead of L due to poor judgments.
In order to guarantee maximum income, it is 
better for banks to acquire as much as they can. 
Moreover, the smaller the coeﬃ  cient a is, the larger 
loss banks will bear. Enterprises would default on 
payment obligations to get more beneﬁ ts. In practice, 
moral hazard still exists because credit managers are 
the speciﬁ c participants. The possibilities of credit 
managers’ violation would exert inﬂ uences over the 
credit game between banks and SMEs. 
In Tab. II, if L receives a loan, business income 
would be B (L) − R, let the reward amount for bank 
credit personnel be W, which is a kind of incentives. 
If the bank does not lend to L, both incomes of the 
enterprise and credit managers are zero. Assuming 
the cost of bribing credit oﬃ  cers for H is P, business 
proﬁ ts would be B (H) − F − P, thus bank oﬃ  cials 
would lose the bank’s reward but receive a bribe P, 
the income for bank oﬃ  cials would be P − W. If H 
gains no loans, the enterprise income would be − F 
and credit managers’ income would be zero. When 
P is greater than W, there is great possibility that 
credit managers take the risk of conducting illegal 
operations. The game result would be as shown in 
Tab. III:
The process of credit is always repetitive; it cannot 
be ﬁ nished once for all. An enterprise can gain 
 
SME 
Enterprises with
low risk (L) 
Enterprises with
high risk (H) 
Apply  Apply Do not apply Do not apply 
Bank  
Issue a loan 
Do not issue 
Bank  
Issue a loan  
Do not issue 
1: Game map tree
II: Diﬀ erent game results of banks’ successful or poor judgments
Game results under successful judgment
Provide a loan Unwilling to loan
Enterprises of high risk (H) (C, − F)
Enterprises of low risk (L) (R, B(L) − R)
Game results under poor judgment
Provide a loan Unwilling to loan
Enterprises of high risk (H) (a × C, C − F − a × C)
Enterprises of low risk (L) (C,0)
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proﬁ ts by making default at the expense of damaging 
the reputation. However, a er several times of game 
process, banks would get real ﬁ nancial information 
of enterprises which defaulted too much, thus banks 
would no longer lend to those SMEs. Therefore 
in the long-term perspective, enterprises should 
adhere to the lending treaty in order to improve 
credit and win trust; it is beneﬁ cial to establish a win-
win situation for banks and SMEs.
In a real-life scenario, the game between banks 
and SMEs would be diﬀ erent considering other 
factors such as collateral, staﬀ  ethics, transaction 
expenses and judicial eﬃ  ciency. Banks could 
recover more loan cost if the risk parameter “a” is 
raised by the rising level of guarantee. Besides, if 
credit managers engage in illegal activities, banks 
would have a greater possibility of suﬀ ering 
loss by loaning to the enterprises with high risk. 
Furthermore, Banks would have to bear the expense 
of legal actions and time value if they choose to 
sue the enterprise instead of eating humble pie. In 
conclusion, information asymmetry is the crux of 
the credit contradiction between SMEs and banks. It 
is also necessary to improve justice eﬃ  ciency as well 
as establish a sound credit rating system and good 
mortgage guarantee system.
Case Study
Tailong commercial bank of Zhejiang China 
focuses on providing ﬁ nancial services to SMEs and 
its service area covers multiple cities in China since 
its establishment in 1993. China Banking Regulatory 
Commission granted Zhejiang Tailong commercial 
bank with 2B level. Tailong commercial bank also 
ranks high in other appraisement of commercial 
banks. The success of Tailong commercial banks 
mainly relies on a big market created by credit 
business for SMEs. Furthermore, the unique 
enterprise culture makes its market positioning 
focusing on SMEs, Tailong commercial bank 
exploited its own strategy for the ﬁ nancing problem 
of SMEs. Therefore Tailong commercial bank earns 
a good reputation in the ﬁ nancial service market 
for SMEs. Its inﬂ uence makes it known as Chinese 
banks’ Yunus. 
The achievement of Tailong commercial bank 
depends on good ﬁ nancing tactics. At the initial 
stage, Tailong commercial bank was forced to 
choose the market of smaller companies because 
it was pushed aside by other larger banks and 
ﬁ nancial institutions. However, Tailong commercial 
bank began to realize that the market of small 
business loan has a huge potential. In order to 
deepen its market positioning, Tailong commercial 
bank extended its services to the group of 
community, rural-urban continuum and rural small 
clients, even including individual business, rural 
contractor, laid-oﬀ  workers, unemployed farmers 
and migrant workers. The statistics show that 
over 99% of Tailong’s clients are small enterprises, 
and over 95% of clients are unsecured. Although 
Tailong commercial bank seems to bear high risk, 
its non-performing loan ratio is far less than other 
commercial banks. 
Tailong commercial bank developed a series 
of loan products with great ﬂ exibility for SMEs. 
For example, it issued loans for entrepreneurs 
who have no mortgage or savings, which greatly 
satisﬁ ed SMEs’ need for entrepreneurial ﬁ nancing. 
Tailong commercial bank also issued moral loan, 
a guarantee type based on the relationship of local 
culture. This type of loans has now helped a large 
number of enterprises and people. Most products 
of Tailong commercial bank are aimed at SMEs. 
The convenient loaning procedure and low access 
threshold are very attractive to SMEs.
During the service practices in the past years, 
Tailong commercial bank developed its own 
characteristic mode of ﬁ nancial services for SMEs in 
order to solve the information asymmetry problem. 
This special mode is based on three requirements of 
qualities, form data and time limit. Firstly, it focuses 
on moral standing of the entrepreneur, the products 
of the enterprise and possessions owned by the 
entrepreneur. Secondly, it checks electricity meter, 
water meter and customs declaration forms to keep 
abreast of the enterprise’s status of production and 
operation. By doing so, Tailong commercial bank 
can not only master more realistic information about 
enterprises, but also reduce the cost of obtaining 
enterprise information before carrying out lending 
transactions. Thirdly, Tailong commercial bank 
adheres to the concept of high eﬃ  ciency, they 
guarantee that issuing loans to regular clients are 
within three hours and to new clients within three 
days.
Moreover, client managers occupy an important 
position in Tailong commercial bank. Up to 50% 
of the employees are client managers, the large 
team of client managers will bring a big pressure 
to the bank because of the high personnel costs. 
However, it pays back. Every client manager is 
required to follow up more than 200 clients to oﬀ er 
III: The game result of bank credit managers and enterprises
L H
Obtain a loan Do not obtain a loan Obtain a loan Do not obtain a loan
Credit managers make 
violations
(W, B (L) − R) (0, − F)
Credit managers 
make no violations
(0,0) (P − W, B (H) − F − P)
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all-around assisting services. Intensive visits and 
frequent contacts are made by client managers to 
get a thorough knowledge of the enterprise’s real 
situation. The powerful social network, information 
network and enterprise network behind every client 
manager makes it easier for Tailong commercial 
bank to control risk as well as the non-performing 
loan ratio. The comprehensive comparison of data 
from computation using statistics tools and from 
real society enables Tailong to fully analyse clients’ 
growth potential and debt-paying ability.
Since most SMEs have a lack of eﬀ ective mortgage, 
Tailong bank weakens its emphasis on mortgage, 
over 95% of Tailong’s products are without any 
collateral. Instead, multi-person guarantee loan 
and moral loan are developed in order to transform 
limited liability to unlimited liability. In addition, 
adaptive reputation mechanism is developed by 
Tailong. Traditionally reputation mechanism is 
based on village culture in the rural areas and 
economically underdeveloped areas, but in mega 
cities such as Shanghai, reputation mechanism is 
based on communalized marketing, focusing on 
a specialized market of similar industry. The lending 
mechanism with guarantee from legal persons and 
aﬃ  liated persons reduces the chance of default and 
the amount of non-performing loan. Therefore, the 
problem of the shortage of eﬀ ective loan collaterals 
for SMEs is relieved to some extent.
There are many advantages for Tailong to focus 
on SME ﬁ nancing. The scale of Tailong is smaller 
than state-owned banks so that Tailong can set up 
a ﬂ exible managerial mechanism to satisfy its clients 
to the maximum extent. Tailong implements the 
mechanism of mutual surveillance with check 
and balance. Under this mechanism, the middle 
level operating managers can have full autonomy 
in management of their departments; individual 
employees’ incomes can be connected with their 
performance. A ﬂ exible incentive mechanism 
arouses everybody’s enthusiasm for SME credit 
business; it also satisﬁ es SMEs’ ﬁ nancing demand 
and improves lending eﬃ  ciency. Meanwhile, 
Tailong establishes a standard corporate governance 
and risk prevention mechanism on the basis of their 
unique managerial system. 
Tailong commercial bank is always known as the 
bank for the poor. Its former grassroots history and 
market positioning have brought advantages for 
itself. Since Tailong is used to be an SME, it insists 
on the self-positioning to focus on SMEs. Moreover, 
Tailong is able to withstand the temptation of high 
margin and big clients in order to be the best in its 
own ﬁ eld on serving SMEs. The signiﬁ cant cost 
advantage of Tailong owes to its close connection 
with clients and low labor costs. In the light the 
market positioning, Tailong keeps track of every 
client, which is convenient to gain information 
at a low cost and in turn it reduces the costs of 
default and supervision. Furthermore, Tailong has 
a small number of staﬀ , which makes lower labor 
costs than those large-scale banks; the frequent 
communication between Tailong’s shareholders 
and agents also reduces the agent cost. Another 
key factor that contributes to Tailong’s success is 
their emphasis on talent training. Tailong College 
is established by the bank in order to cultivate 
professional talents to better serve SMEs; all 
employees must go through vigorous courses and 
assessments in order to oﬀ er better services to 
clients. The increase of the investment on human 
resources satisﬁ es the small-sized, wide-covered 
and short-term ﬁ nancial requirements of SMEs to 
the maximum extent. In particular, most customer 
managers are localized in order to make use of 
familiarity with local clients to solve the information 
asymmetry as far as possible; in addition, the 
restricting personnel selecting principle which 
puts an emphasis on selecting the most outstanding 
talents fully arouses employees’ potential.
Nevertheless, there are still some inevitable 
problems for banks like Tailong. It is easy to trigger 
crisis of conﬁ dence for small and medium-sized 
banks since they are small-scaled and not state-
guaranteed. Crisis of conﬁ dence is the situations 
that when public trust expectation towards banks 
is smaller than their psychological expectations, 
people trigger early withdrawal agitation which 
would turn into a run on the bank. It would bring 
serious consequences, which are very diﬃ  cult for 
banks to handle. The market of SME credit business 
is also facing threats since large-scale national 
banks gradually realize the development potential 
and proﬁ t margins of SMEs and other small and 
medium-sized banks would just copy Tailong’s 
successful pattern. With loosened credit policy 
for SMEs, public identity and high credibility, the 
involvement of national banks may lead to more 
intense competition in grabbing SME market share; 
more business pressure would come from other 
banks’ imitating of Tailong’s business model. Last 
but not the least, internal operations carry risks. 
Capital size of banks is the last line of defence for 
compensating unexpected loss and safeguarding 
depositors’ interests. In the light of the restriction of 
bank’s asset liability ratio, banks cannot unlimitedly 
expand proportional relationships between 
assets and liabilities. Meanwhile, the source of 
smaller banks’ capital is relatively single and the 
expansion path of capital is quite narrow. The 
issuance of subordinated debt and hybrid capital 
debt is therefore restricted by various government 
regulations. Since most small and medium-sized 
commercial banks were established by private 
capitals, the employees may not be very professional 
and some shareholders may be given too much 
power in the board of directors, which could lead 
to structural distortion of the organization and 
confusion of operation power and management 
power. In addition, it is easy to have the problem 
of relationship lending or inclined lending if the 
phenomenon that lending needs to be decided 
by relationships with shareholders is not under 
control, it could even cause credit risk for banks.
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In conclusion, the business model of Tailong 
surely can be copied; the success of Tailong is no 
accident. Tailong’s focus on SMEs brings itself 
enormous proﬁ ts, and the high proﬁ ts stimulate 
the company to grow faster. Thus it is possible to 
copy this successful model with adequate capital 
and proﬁ ts. Moreover, inherent mechanism is 
the starting point of dealing with SME credit gap. 
Commercial banks should make innovations in 
providing ﬁ nancial products to SMEs in order to 
deal with SME ﬁ nancing problem. To develop small 
and medium-sized banks and regional commercial 
banks is an important direction for future domestic 
banking industry, and economic policies will 
continue to make it easier for SMEs to receive loans. 
China’s current situation of diversiﬁ ed consumer 
groups creates an increasing need for small and 
medium-sized banks and regional commercial 
banks since they can help people solve problems 
more conveniently.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Apparently, SMEs need to improve their credit 
reputation, since the credit crunch is closely 
related to the qualiﬁ cations of those smaller 
enterprises (Davies, 2006; Hsu, 2006). First, SMEs 
should improve their operation management in 
order to reduce the operation risks. By starting 
with an examination and improvement of current 
organizational system, technical concept and market 
innovation, SMEs can improve their proﬁ tability, 
repaying ability and credit degree. SMEs should 
also develop a normalized and scientiﬁ c ﬁ nancial 
management system to increase the reliability and 
transparency of ﬁ nancial statements in order to 
reﬂ ect the real situation. It is also important for 
SMEs to build up the system of repaying loans on 
time to set up their good corporate images.
The next step that SMEs should take is to handle 
their relationship with banks very carefully, 
reducing banks’ credit cost consciously by 
presenting their real information to the banks to 
create a mutually-beneﬁ cial and win-win situation. 
SMEs can also connect saving account with credit 
amount, making it convenient for banks to gain 
a comprehensive knowledge about borrowers. In 
the case study, Tailong commercial bank strived 
to establish a close relationship with SMEs for 
information gathering and credit evaluation. This 
is the eﬀ ort from the bank side. From SMEs’ side, 
they should also take a proactive attitude to establish 
a close and good relationship with banks.
Given the low level of national economic 
development and imperfect social credit system, 
banks are always reluctant to issue loans to 
SMEs (Li et al., 2012). It is necessary for SMEs to 
look for practical and eﬀ ective intermediation. 
The involvement of private capital could also 
be encouraged to expand the coverage of credit 
guarantee. Through the platform of intermediary 
credit, credit information of SMEs and credit ﬁ les 
of enterprise managers could be shared on the 
Internet. The establishment of social credit system 
would solve the problem of information asymmetry. 
The Tailong case shows that a sound social credit 
system has been established in limited regions for 
limited SMEs and it worked very well. Both the bank 
and the SMEs can beneﬁ t from the credit system. 
Therefore the social credit system needs to be 
expanded to the whole country taking into account 
the economic and cultural imbalances in diﬀ erent 
regions. A healthy and eﬃ  cient social credit system 
lays a solid foundation to solve the ﬁ nancing 
problems for SMEs.
As Tailong shows, the team of customer managers 
is at the forefront of the SME credit chain, it is 
essential for commercial banks to improve the 
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2: The sketch map of risk prevention system (source: the official website of Tailong commercial bank: http://www.
zjtlcb.com)
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team structure of customer managers for entering 
small business credit market quickly. In the highly 
competitive market, commercial banks have to 
enrich the marketing team and improve marketing 
service level. In order to ensure that the number 
of customer managers match the business scale 
and business goal, a specialized team of customer 
managers should be built to carry out targeted 
marketing. While regional business centres for 
SMEs are set up for specialized marketing, more 
branches should be established at very basic level 
to maintain good customer relationships and 
know customers’ ﬁ nancial status well. Apart from 
employing innovative, honest, self-discipline 
individuals with strong business ability, it is 
important to set up an incentive and risk evaluation 
mechanism to further prevent credit risk. On this 
basis, business performance appraisal system with 
the core of economic value added is beneﬁ cial to 
overcome the existing defects in the present SME 
credit assessment mechanism. Moreover, customer 
managers should take periodical trainings for 
integrating theory with practice to continuously 
attune to SMEs’ ﬁ nancing wants and needs.
Consistent proﬁ ts also depend on the careful 
selection of customers, and commercial banks 
should choose quality SMEs based on the following 
criteria: seeking for quality clients from the industry 
chain such as SMEs related to local-supported 
enterprises; utilizing local websites and newspapers 
where SME information is gathered to make choices; 
choosing SMEs cultivated in high-tech zones. SMEs 
in a growing-up period should be the key target 
clients of commercial banks. Client sorting requires 
commercial banks to pay close attention to ongoing 
information updating.
The need of SMEs for diversiﬁ ed ﬁ nancial services 
is rising in line with the fast economic development 
in China. Commercial banks can make the most 
of the advantages of technology, settling accounts 
and bank outlets to oﬀ er tailored services to 
satisfy outstanding SME ﬁ nancing demands. The 
innovation in guarantee mechanisms is needed in 
the ﬁ rst place because insuﬃ  cient collateral is the 
common feature of SMEs. Commercial banks could 
turn enterprise guarantee into group guarantee, 
which requires a close-related group like a family 
to compensate debt if the enterprise defaults on 
a loan. One of the secrets for Tailong’s success is that 
it has a very innovative guarantee mechanism or 
credit mechanism which allows SMEs to use third 
parties for credit and debit payment guarantee. 
Therefore the consequence of defaulting for SMEs 
would not only be money, but also the high cost 
of moral conscience. Besides, members of the 
group who know much about the business’s credit 
situation would not easily guarantee enterprises 
with poor credit, and it helps banks lower their 
risks. Commercial banks could also require SMEs 
to deposit a certain amount of money periodically 
until they pay oﬀ  the credit, which could function 
as a supervision of payment. If SMEs pay principal 
and interest on time, commercial banks could also 
return a part of interest as an incentive to reduce 
SMEs’ loan risks.
Under the new economic environment, the 
government should play a guiding role (Suﬁ an, 
2012), to lead commercial banks to perform 
appropriate ﬁ nancing strategies towards SMEs 
by scientiﬁ c economic means instead of forced 
intervention. Government could ﬁ rst encourage 
banks to carry out credit business for SMEs through 
moral persuasion, risk compensation and policy-
related subsidies. Policy-based ﬁ nancial institutions 
and guarantee corporations could be introduced to 
SMEs by government with government’s drawing 
from tax growth as supplementary fund. The 
transaction cost between banks and SMEs could 
be reduced by government’s eﬀ orts in reducing 
processing fees and improving judicial eﬃ  ciency 
of mortgage deals. Thus, when SMEs are in lack of 
collateral, policy-based ﬁ nancial institutions can 
guarantee for them to reduce banks’ risk. If the 
enterprise defaults on the loan, those guarantee 
agencies would pay oﬀ  debts and share the 
responsibility of debt collection. This would ensure 
safety of banks’ capital and reduce the amount of 
bad loans. 
The evaluation system of SMEs’ credit grade needs 
to be improved as well for solving information 
asymmetry problem. It is the credit rating that 
makes SMEs become trustworthy enough to 
gain capital (Andreassen, 2008). Furthermore, 
government should establish credit management 
system to determine the credit ratings for diﬀ erent 
SMEs in order to ensure the money spent is an 
eﬀ ective investment, and it is necessary to regularly 
update customer information database in order to 
implement corresponding surveillance measures 
and credit policies. 
CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper is to study the credit 
policy problems between SMEs and commercial 
banks in China as this is a hot topic in recent years 
in Chinese economic development. This paper 
discusses the problems and the reasons of “credit 
grudging” behavior of China’s commercial banks 
and SMEs ﬁ nancing diﬃ  culties. The paper also 
uses the dynamic game theory to probe into credit 
problems between SMEs and commercial banks 
under the conditions of information asymmetry. It 
is found that the banking industry’s development 
prospect is closely related to the reshaping of its 
ﬁ nancing relationship with SMEs. It is important 
to ﬁ nd and cultivate quality SME clients since it 
has a great inﬂ uence on commercial banks’ future 
development and transition. In this paper the 
dynamic game model of credit is used to study the 
risks of commercial banks’ credit business and 
whether to give loans to SMEs or not. Through 
a detailed case study of Tailong commercial bank, 
comments and suggestions are presented from three 
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perspectives of SMEs, commercial banks and the 
government, in order to solve the credit problems 
between commercial banks and SMEs and to reach 
a win-win solution.
At present, China’s capital market is still not full-
ﬂ edged, which makes bank-dominated indirect 
ﬁ nancing the principal part of the country’s 
ﬁ nancing system. However, reputable SMEs will 
soon become the targeted clients of the banking 
industry due to the strong competition and 
development in the industry, and SME credit 
business will become the key business of China’s 
banking industry.
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